A judge's success in rendering a weighty, just and scholarly and fair judgment depends on knowledge that far surpasses mere legal and jurisprudential learning and experience. In the writings of critics, researchers, professors, and legal writers, this fundamental and essential question has not yet been addressed: why are many judgments rendered by judges, and even by justices of the Supreme Court, written in a disjointed and disconected manner, far from legal logic? And in a word, they do not please fair-minded thinkers, genius, legal-minded rationalists, and those concerned about justice, freedom, and citizen rights. Ignorance of history of law and philosophy of law can be considered as one of the most prominent causes of this failure. The following discussion attempts to address from a new perspective the pathology of ignoring the history and philosophy of law in judgments rendered by judges. The richness, sublimity and prominance of a judgment and the wisdom of the judge depend on realms of understanding that lie far beyond mere knowledge of law and jurisprudence and outward adherence to formal framework of the judgments.