The nationalization of private banks in Iran in 1979, following the Islamic Revolution and driven by the objective of restructuring the banking system and eliminating usury, triggered a series of complex legal challenges regarding the recognition and protection of shareholders’ legitimate rights. This transformation, while framed as a public interest initiative, led to the deprivation of ownership for many minority shareholders, prompting a wave of legal claims against state-owned banks and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, which serves as the custodian of government-held shares in these institutions. This study aims to explore the legal foundations and procedural requirements for initiating claims to recover the value of shares following nationalization. It centers on the analysis of a specific judicial ruling issued at both the trial and appellate levels, and incorporates a comprehensive review of relevant legislative instruments, including the 1979 Law on the Administration of Banks and the Draft Law on the Protection of Minority Shareholders. Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology, the research evaluates the legal reasoning adopted by the courts and the statutory framework governing shareholder rights. The findings underscore that newly established banks, as legal successors to the merged entities, bear the responsibility to compensate shareholders. Furthermore, the referral of such claims to the Ministry lacks a clear statutory mandate and may undermine the principle of legal certainty. Banking notices that purport to extinguish shareholder claims after the statutory deadline of 1982 are found to be inconsistent with the principle of vested rights and cannot, in the absence of explicit legislative authority, nullify legitimate entitlements. The judicial ruling under scrutiny reveals a fundamental tension between collective public interests and individual property rights, particularly in claims seeking both the current market value of shares and delay damages. These claims are deemed legally untenable due to the expropriatory nature of nationalization. The article concludes by advocating for the establishment of clearer legal mechanisms and the explicit legislative recognition of the new banks’ obligation to pay the book value of shares, as a necessary measure to resolve this enduring legal conflict.