This article examines the establishment of the “Advisory Council for Assisting Judges” as provided in the Judiciary’s Document on Transformation and Excellence in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It begins by offering a descriptive account of the legal design, objectives, and institutional framework of this council, situating it within the broader policy response to judicial delay in complex, high-profile, and multi-claimant cases. While acknowledging certain limited advantages—such as the formalization of previously informal practices and the articulation of managerial and social concerns—the article emphasizes that these purported benefits do not suffice to legitimize the council within Iran’s existing constitutional and procedural architecture.
The central argument advanced is that the recognition and operation of this advisory council constitute a clear instance of the personalization and tastefulness of Iranian law. Through a detailed critical analysis, the article demonstrates that the council lacks a statutory foundation, conflicts with multiple provisions of the Iranian Constitution, undermines the principle of judicial independence, weakens the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings, and erodes the principle of legality in judicial process. Moreover, by employing indeterminate and elastic concepts and by introducing non-transparent decision-making structures, the council exemplifies a broader tendency within the Iranian judicial system toward ad hoc, taste-driven governance detached from the rule of law. The article concludes that, notwithstanding its reformist rhetoric, this institutional innovation risks inflicting structural damage on constitutional resilience and judicial legality in Iran, thereby necessitating serious reconsideration.